Social agency and enactivism

Notes for thinking about the relationship between moral norms and bodies

Abstract

The aim is to link the understanding of social agency proposed by Saba Mahmood with the enactivist concepts of bodies, social interaction and normativity, to answer the question of how we inhabit, relate to and constitute ourselves through and with moral norms. To this end, I present Mahmood's characterization of social agency, highlighting the weight of moral norms in its constitution; subsequently, the enactivist concepts of bodies, social interaction and normativity –proposed mainly by Ezequiel A. Di Paolo, Elena Clare Cuffari and Hanne De Jaegher– are developed. In a third moment, the intersections between the proposals are shown in order to show their complementarity. With respect to the central question, it is affirmed that 1) we inhabit moral norms as they are present in our bodies when we perform acts, expressions and practices with other bodies; 2) moral norms influence the constitution of subjects in their different bodily dimensions through the interactions we have with others; and 3) there is a multiplicity of ways in which subjects relate to and actualize moral norms to regulate social interactions, and not all of them are amenable to exploration through the resistance-continuity dichotomy.