Wittgenstein and the articulation of the proposition

Authors

  • Sandra Lazzer Universidad de Buenos Aires - Universidad Nacional de Rosario, Argentina

Keywords:

Wittgenstein, proposition, logic, name, form

Abstract

In this paper I intend to argue in favour of the interpretation according to which the early Wittgenstein’s views concerning the articulation or unity of the proposition are directly linked to his criticism of the Russellian multiple relation theory of judgement. The notion of propositional articulation that emerges in Notes on Logic is based upon the classification of propositional constituents into two logically distinct categories: names and forms. The concept of picture (Bild) makes its first appearance in the Tractatus, since the notion of sense that Wittgenstein assumes in the Notes does not require an identity of form between the proposition and what it depicts.

Author Biography

Sandra Lazzer, Universidad de Buenos Aires - Universidad Nacional de Rosario, Argentina

Licenciada en Filosofía por la Universidad de Buenos Aires. Es docente e investigadora en el área de Lógica y Filosofía de la Lógica de la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras (Universidad de Buenos Aires, UBA) y de la Facultad de Humanidades y Artes (Universidad Nacional de Rosario, UNR). Tiene diversas publicaciones en revistas nacionales e internacionales. Es vicepresidenta de la Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico (SADAF).

References

Bradley, F. H. (1893). Appearance and Reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1930.

Griffin, N. (1985). "Russell’s Multiple Relation Theory of Judgement", en Philosophical Studies, 47, pp. 213-247.

Hanks, P. W. (2007). "How Wittgenstein Defeated Russell’s Multiple Relation Theory of Judgement", in Synthese, 154, pp. 121-146.

Hylton, P. (1984). "The Nature of the proposition and the revolt against idealism", en R. Rorty, J. B. Schneewind y Q. Skinner (eds.). Philosophy in History. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Potter, M. (2009). Wittgenstein’s Notes on Logic. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Russell, B. (1903). Principles of Mathematics. London: George Allen and Unwin.

Russell, B. (1986). "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism”, en Slater J. G. (ed.). The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, Vol. 8 (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism and Other Essays 1914-1919). London: George Allen & Unwin.

Tomasini Bassols, A. (2011). Explicando el Tractatus: Una introducción a la Primera Filosofía de Wittgenstein. Buenos Aires: Grama Ediciones.

Wittgenstein, L. (1961). Notes on Logic, en Notebooks 1914-1916. von Wright, G & Ascombe, G. (eds.). Harper Torchbooks.

Wittgenstein, L. (1974). Letters to Russell, Keynes & Moore. von Wright, G (ed.). Oxford: Blackwell.

Wittgenstein, L. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. A. Tomasini Bassols (trad.). En www.filosoficas.unam.mx.

Downloads

Published

2015-01-15

How to Cite

Lazzer, S. (2015). Wittgenstein and the articulation of the proposition. Devenires, 16(31), 159–175. Retrieved from https://publicaciones.umich.mx/revistas/devenires/ojs/article/view/287

Issue

No. 31 (2015)

Section

Dossier

License

Copyright (c) 2015 UMSNH

Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.